By a well-known result of Cook and Reckhow [4, 12] , all Frege systems for the Classical Propositional Calculus (CPC ) are polynomially equivalent. Mints and Kojevnikov [11] have recently shown p-equivalence of Frege systems for the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC ) in the standard language, building on a description of admissible rules of IPC by Iemhoff [8] . We prove a similar result for an infinite family of normal modal logics, including K4, GL, S4, and S4Grz .
Introduction
The basic topic of proof complexity is to study the efficiency of proof systems for logical systems, either absolute (lower and upper bounds on lengths of proofs) or relative (simulation or relative speed-up of proof systems). Frege proof systems, in which formulas are derived using a finite set of schematic inference rules (as in the usual "textbook" calculi), are among the most natural systems to study. The main interest in proof complexity is devoted to proof systems for the classical propositional logic (CPC ), due to its relationship to central problems of computational complexity: as shown in [4] , there exists a polynomially bounded proof system for CPC if and only if NP = coNP . Existence of lower bounds on lengths of proofs in Frege systems is an important open problem in this area; sofar we have good information only on restricted fragments of Frege systems, such as the bounded depth systems. Much less is known about the proof complexity of non-classical logics; among the most interesting results are the feasible disjunction property and feasible interpolation for intuitionistic logic [1, 2] and several modal logics [5] .
In CPC , the notion of a Frege system is very robust: by Reckhow [12] , all classical Frege systems are polynomially equivalent, regardless of the particular set of rules of the system, or the choice of the language (set of basic connectives). The situation is much more complicated for non-classical logics. Reckhow's proof of language independence fails for intuitionistic and modal logics 1 , and it is not clear whether the expected answer should be positive or negative.
Even if we consider only Frege systems in a fixed language, a straightforward polynomial simulation does not work, due to presence of nontrivial admissible rules. A rule ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ψ is admissible in a logic L, provided for every substitution σ, if L contains the formulas σϕ 1 , . . . , σϕ n , then it also contains σψ. Every rule which is valid in L (i.e., ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ψ) is also admissible in L. It is not hard to see that the classical logic is structurally complete: every admissible rule is valid. On the other hand, nonclassical logics often admit invalid rules. For example, the Kreisel-Putnam rule
is admissible in the intuitionistic logic (IPC ), although it is not intuitionistically valid. Similarly, in many modal logics (like K4 or GL) the rule ϕ ϕ is admissible but invalid. Rules of a (sound and implicationally complete) Frege system for a logic L need not be valid: they only need to preserve the set of theorems of L, i.e., to be admissible. Consequently, a rule of a Frege system for a structually incomplete logic L may be nonderivable in another Frege system for L.
Admissibility in modal and superintuitionistic logics was studied in depth by Rybakov in the 80's and 90's, see [13] . He showed that the problem of recognizing admissible rules is decidable for a large class of logics, and provided semantical criteria for admissibility. Ghilardi [6, 7] found a characterization of admissible rules in terms of projective formulas, connecting admissibility to the unification problem for Heyting and modal algebras. Based on this result, Iemhoff [8] proved completeness of an explicit basis of admissible rules for IPC . In a similar spirit, bases of admissible rules for some modal logics were constructed by Jeřábek [9] .
Mints and Kojevnikov [11] have shown that rules from the basis of [8] can be polynomially simulated in the natural deduction system for IPC , using an efficient variant of Kleene's slash [10, 5] , thereby establishing polynomial equivalence of Frege systems for IPC in the standard language {→, ∧, ∨, ⊥}.
In the present paper we will generalize the result of Mints and Kojevnikov to a family of normal modal logics, using the bases of admissible rules for these logics from [9] . We use propositional valuations as the modal analogue of Kleene's slash; unlike the intuitionistic case, we avoid translating the proofs back and forth to natural deduction, we work directly with Frege systems. This change considerably simplifies the argument, even for the few modal logics which are known to have a decent natural deduction proof system. Modal logics covered by our result include K4, GL, S4, their extensions by the Grzegorczyk or McKinsey axioms, and other logics, like Zeman's S4.1.4. In fact, the result applies to the infinite family of all (finitely axiomatizable) extensible logics as introduced in [9] . To achieve this level of generality, we provide a description of extensible logics using Zakharyaschev's canonical formulas [14] . We also show that Frege systems for extensible logics enjoy the feasible disjunction property, which generalizes the results of [5] .
Preliminaries
Formulas of the basic modal language are constructed from propositional variables and the connectives →, ⊥, . Other connectives are treated as abbreviations; apart from the usual propositional connectives ∧, ∨, ¬, ≡, we will use ♦ϕ := ¬ ¬ϕ, ϕ := ϕ ∧ ϕ, and · ♦ϕ := ¬ ¬ϕ = ϕ ∨ ♦ϕ. A set L of formulas is a normal modal logic, if L contains all propositional tautologies and the schema
and L is closed under substitution, Modus Ponens (MP) and Necessitation (Nec):
The minimal normal modal logic is called K. We denote by L ⊕ ϕ the smallest normal logic containing L and ϕ. The logics most often used in this paper are K4 := K ⊕ (4), GL := K ⊕ (GL) = K4 ⊕ (GL), and S4 := K4 ⊕ (T ), where
An inference system F is a set of schematic inference rules. A finite sequence π = ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ n of formulas is an F -proof of a formula α from assumptions β 1 , . . . , β k , if ϕ n = α, and every ϕ i is equal to some β j , or is inferred by an instance of an F -rule from some of the formulas ϕ j , j < i. We write β 1 , . . . , β k F α if there is an F -proof of α from β, and say that the rule β α is derivable in F . Rules without assumptions are called axioms.
A finite inference system F is a Frege system for a normal logic L, if F is
• implicationally complete: ϕ, ϕ → ψ F ψ.
Notice that a complete inference system is sound iff all rules of F are L-admissible.
The general concept of a proof system was introduced by Cook and Reckhow [4] : a proof system for a logic L is a polynomial-time computable function P such that rng(P ) = L. A proof system P polynomially simulates (p-simulates, in short) a proof system Q, if there exists a polynomial-time function f such that Q = P • f . We write Q ≤ p P if P p-simulates Q. Proof systems P and Q are polynomially equivalent, if P ≤ p Q and Q ≤ p P . A Frege system F (or in general, an inference system with a polynomial-time set of rules) fits the definition of a proof system if we put
The concept of admissibility can be naturally extended to multiple-conclusion rules. A multiple-conclusion rule
is L-admissible, if the following holds for all substitutions σ: if σϕ i ∈ L for every i, then there exists j such that σψ j ∈ L. For example, a logic L is consistent iff it admits the rule ⊥ L has the disjunction property, if it admits the rule (DP)
for every n ∈ ω. (The empty disjunction is defined as ⊥, and the empty conjunction is .) A set B of (single-conclusion) rules is a basis of L-admissible rules, if L admits all rules from B, and every L-admissible rule is derivable in the inference system consisting of B, and the postulated inference rules of L (i.e., (MP), (Nec), axioms of K, and additional axioms of L, if any). A similar concept for multiple-conclusion rules may be introduced as follows. A set A of multiple-conclusion rules is an AR-system over L, if A is closed under substitution, cut, and weakening, and contains postulated rules of inference of L. The set of all L-admissible multiple-conclusion rules is an AR-system over L, denoted by A L . A set B is a basis of Ladmissible multiple-conclusion rules, if A L is the smallest AR-system over L which contains B.
Following [9] , we define the multiple-conclusion rules
and their single-conclusion variants
where n, m ∈ ω. Their importance comes from the following theorem. Theorem 2.1 ( [9] ) Let A be one of
If a normal modal logic L admits A, then A is a basis of L-admissible multiple-conclusion rules, and A is a basis of L-admissible single-conclusion rules.
A normal modal logic L which satisfies the assumptions of theorem 2.1 is called extensible 2 . The logics K4, S4, and GL are extensible. Other examples of extensible logics include S4Grz := S4 ⊕ (Grz), S4.1 := S4 ⊕ (.1), K4Grz := K4 ⊕ (Grz), and K4.1 := K4 ⊕ (.1), where
(The system S4Grz is often called just Grz .)
The structure of extensible logics
The transformation used in the proof of our main theorem in the next section is very sensitive to the syntactical form of an axiom system for the logics involved. As we apply the transformation to an infinite class of logics, we need some kind of a "normal form" for their axiomatization. To this end we provide a frame-theoretic characterization of extensible modal logics, which we then restate in terms of Zakharyaschev's canonical formulas. A reader interested only in K4, S4, or GL may safely skip this section.
We assume some degree of familiarity with Kripke semantics. For more background on general frame semantics and canonical formulas, consult Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [3] ; here we only briefly mention the basic definitions to fix the notation. Definition 3.1 A Kripke frame is a pair K, < , where K is a nonempty set, and < is a transitive binary relation on K. We denote by ≤ the reflexive closure of <.
A general frame is a triple K, <, V , where K, < is a Kripke frame, and V is a set of subsets of K which is closed under (binary) intersection, complement, and the operation A = {x ∈ K; ∀y > x y ∈ A}.
A Kripke frame K, < is identified with the general frame K, <, P(K) . A valuation is admissible in K, <, V , if (p) = {x; x p} ∈ V for every variable p. A formula ϕ is valid in K, <, V , if it is satisfied by all admissible valuations.
A general frame K, <, V is descriptive if
(iii ) every subset of V with the finite intersection property has a nonempty intersection.
A Kripke model K, <, induces a general frame K, <, V by V = { (ϕ); ϕ a formula}. C L,κ denotes the descriptive frame induced by the canonical model of L in κ variables. Definition 3.2 Let F, <, V be a general frame, and
for every z. The frame F is •-extensible, if every finite Y ⊆ F has an irreflexive tight predecessor, and it is •-extensible, if every Y has a reflexive tight predecessor.
Proof: If x is a set of formulas, let x := { ϕ; ϕ ∈ x}, ¬x := {¬ϕ; ϕ ∈ x}, x := {ϕ; ϕ ∈ x}, and x := {ϕ; ϕ ∈ x}. If x and y are maximal L-consistent sets (L-MCS), we have x < y iff x ⊆ y by definition of the canonical model. It is easy to see that
Assume that L admits A • , and let y 1 , . . . , y k be L-MCS. Put a := ( i y i ) , and let b be the complement of a. We claim that a ∪ ¬ b is L-consistent. If not, there are α ∈ a and β ∈ b such that
Let x be a MCS extending a ∪ ¬ b, we will verify that x is an irreflexive t.p. of {y 1 , . . . , y k }. Clearly x ⊆ a ⊆ y i , thus x < z whenever y i ≤ z. Let z be a MCS such that z ≥ y i for no i. Fix formulas ϕ i such that ϕ i ∈ y i , and ϕ i / ∈ z. Then i ϕ i ∈ a, thus i ϕ i ∈ x. However i ϕ i / ∈ z, thus x < z. The proof for the reflexive case is analogous, taking x ⊇ {ϕ ≡ ϕ; ϕ ∈ a} ∪ ¬ b.
Definition 3.4 The symbol i F i denotes the disjoint sum of general frames F i . Let * ∈ {•, •}. If F, <, V is a general frame, let F * , <, V * be the frame obtained from F by adjoining a new root r, such that r is reflexive if * = • and irreflexive if * = •, and V * = {A ⊆ V * ; A ∩ F ∈ V }. A class C of rooted general frames is * -extensible if ( i<k F i ) * ∈ C for any finite sequence of frames F i ∈ C, i < k. (ii ) All canonical frames C L,κ are * -extensible.
(iii ) The class of all rooted descriptive L-frames is * -extensible.
(iv ) L is sound and complete wrt a * -extensible class C of general frames, closed under formation of rooted generated subframes.
Fix rooted models F j , r j , j such that F j ∈ C, and r j j i ϕ i ∧ ¬ψ j . Put F = ( j F j ) * ∈ C, and let be a valuation in F which agrees with j on F j , and is arbitrary in the root r of F . Clearly r j ψ j . Moreover r i ϕ i if * = •, and
As F is a descriptive L-frame, it is (isomorphic to) a generated subframe of a canonical frame C L,κ for some cardinal κ (cf. [3] ). Let x i ∈ C L,κ be the roots of F i , and let x ∈ C L,κ be a (reflexive or irreflexive, as appropriate) tight predecessor of {x i ; i < k}. If x is distinct from all x i , the subframe generated by x is isomorphic to F * , thus F * is an L-frame. If x = x i for some i, we must have k = 1. We have just established that (F 0 + F 0 ) * is an L-frame, and F * = F * 0 is a p-morphic image of (F 0 + F 0 ) * , thus F * is an L-frame as well. We remark that condition (iii) in theorem 3.5 can be generalized to nondescriptive frames, see theorem 3.11. Definition 3.6 Let K, <, V be a general frame, and F, < a finite Kripke frame. A partial mapping f from K onto F is a subreduction of K to F , if for every x, y ∈ K and u ∈ F , (i ) x < y and x, y ∈ dom(f ) implies f (x) < f (y),
(ii ) if f (x) < u, there exists y ∈ dom(f ) such that x < y and f (y) = u,
For any X ⊆ K, let X↑ = {y; ∃x ∈ X x ≤ y}. We will abbreviate {x}↑ as x↑. A domain is an upwards closed subset d ⊆ F . A subreduction f satisfies the closed domain condition
Definition 3.7 Let F, < be a finite Kripke frame with root 0 ∈ F , and D a set of domains in F . The canonical formula α(F, D) in variables {p i ; i ∈ F } is defined as
where indices i, j range over elements of F . 
Remark 3.10 We have departed from the original Zakharyaschev's presentation of canonical formulas in several details. Most importantly, we allow domains to be empty; a subreduction satisfies CDC for the empty domain iff it is cofinal, thus Zakharyaschev's α(F, D, ⊥) is our α(F, D ∪ {∅}).
We are ready for the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.11 Let L be a consistent normal extension of K4. The following are equivalent.
where L 0 is K4, S4, or GL, and the root of each F i belongs to a proper cluster.
Proof: (iii) → (i) follows from theorem 3.5, as a disjoint union of L-frames is an L-frame.
(ii) → (iii): let K be a general L-frame, and * as in (iii). Clearly K * is an L 0 -frame. Let f be a subreduction of K * to F i which satisfies CDC for D i . As the root of F i belongs to a proper cluster, there is an x distinct from the root of K * such that f (x) is the root of F i . Then f K is a subreduction of K to F i with CDC for D i , a contradiction. Therefore K * is an L-frame.
(i) → (ii): the core of the argument is the following property.
be all rooted subframes of F generated by immediate successors of the root of F , and put
Assume further that one of the following holds:
(i ) the root of F is irreflexive, and L admits A • ,
(ii ) the root of F is a simple reflexive cluster, and L admits A • .
Then there exists i < k such that α(
Proof: Assume that for every i < k, α(
For each i, let K i be a descriptive L-frame, and f i a subreduction from K i to F i with CDC for D i . We may assume that K i is rooted, and the root of K i is in the domain of f i . Let * = • or • according to whether (i) or (ii) holds, and let K = ( i K i ) * . As L admits A * , K is an L-frame by theorem 3.5. Let f be the partial mapping from K to F which extends i f i , and maps the root r of K to the root of F . It is easy to see that f is a subreduction.
To show that f satisfies CDC for D, assume x ∈ K dom(f ) and f (x↑) = d ∈ D. As x = r ∈ dom(f ), we have x ∈ K i for some i < k.
Choose L 0 in the obvious way, and put
Clearly L ⊆ L. The other inclusion L ⊆ L is by theorem 3.9 equivalent to
which follows from claim 1 by induction on the depth of F .
Corollary 3.12
Every extensible logic is a union of a non-decreasing sequence of finitely axiomatizable extensible logics.
Theorem 3.11 implies that the only extensible extension of GL is GL itself (this was already noted in [9] ). On the other hand, the intervals [K4, K4Grz ] and [S4, S4Grz ] each contain 2 ω extensible logics. Infinitely many of them are finitely axiomatizable (witness e.g. S4⊕α(C n , ∅), where C n is the n-element cluster, n ≥ 2).
Example 3.13 Some well-known extensible logics can be represented as follows:
where C 2 is the 2-element cluster.
Example 3.14 Dummett's logic
is not extensible. We have Dum = S4 ⊕ α(F 1 , ∅) ⊕ α(F 2 , ∅), where F 1 and F 2 are the frames depicted in figure 1 (cf. [3] ). By the proof of theorem 3.11, any extensible logic which contains α(F 2 , ∅) also proves α(C 2 , ∅) = (Grz), but Dum S4Grz . On the other hand, the closely related logic (called S4.1.4 by Zeman [15] )
is extensible.
• Figure 1 : forbidden subframes for Dum
Equivalence of Frege systems for extensible logics
In this section, we are going prove our main result (theorem 4.8): Frege systems for any extensible logic are p-equivalent. We begin with a few simple observations.
Lemma 4.1 ([12])
Let F and G be inference systems, such that G is finite, and all rules of G are derivable in F . Then G ≤ p F .
Proof: For each rule ∈ G, fix a derivation π of in F . Given a G-proof π, construct an equivalent F -proof by replacing each application of ∈ G in π with the appropriate substitution instance of π . Proof: Let F 0 be the Frege system consisting of Modus Ponens, and axioms ϕ, ϕ, for any axiom ϕ of F std (including explicitely the axiom (4)). We have F ≥ p F 0 by lemma 4.1, it thus suffices to show F 0 ≥ p F std .
Given an F std -proof π = ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ n of a formula ϕ = ϕ n , we construct the sequence ϕ 0 , ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ n , ϕ n , and complete it to an F 0 -proof by inserting instances of (K) and (4): when a formula ϕ was inferred in π by (MP) from ϕ j and ϕ k = (ϕ j → ϕ i ), we include the axiom
and derive ϕ i from ϕ j and (ϕ j → ϕ i ) by two applications of (MP). When ϕ i = ϕ j was inferred from ϕ j by (Nec), we use in a similar fashion the axiom
Definition 4.4 Let L be a finitely axiomatizable extensible logic. For definiteness, we assume that F std for L is given by its representation
from theorem 3.11. The inference system F adm consists of F std , and the infinitely many rules
Corollary 4.5 Let L be a finitely axiomatizable extensible logic. Then F adm p-simulates any Frege system for L.
Proof: Use theorem 2.1 and lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.6 Let L be a extensible logic. There exists a Frege system for L if and only if L is finitely axiomatizable.
Proof: The "if" direction is trivial. Let F be a finite set of Frege rules which is complete for L. By theorem 2.1, we may assume that F = F std ∪ F , where F std is the standard Frege system of a finitely axiomatized logic L ⊆ L, and F consists of instances of A • or A • . By corollary 3.12, we may assume that L is extensible. Then L admits the rules from F , thus L = L is finitely axiomatizable.
Definition 4.7 A propositional valuation is an assignment of truth values 0, 1 to modal formulas, which respects Boolean connectives. To stress the analogy with the intuitionistic case, we will denote propositional valuations by the slash symbol |, and we will write |ϕ instead of |(ϕ) = 1.
Theorem 4.8 Let L be a extensible modal logic. Then any two Frege systems for L (in the basic modal language) are polynomially equivalent.
Proof: By lemma 4.6, we may assume that L is finitely axiomatizable. By lemma 4.3 and corollary 4.5, it suffices to show F adm ≤ p F std . We define an auxiliary Frege system F 1 , which consists of F std , the relativized necessitation rule
and finitely many propositional rules. (We do not list them explicitely, we will simply use freely propositional reasoning in the rest of the proof; the reader can easily verify that a finite list of extra rules is sufficient to support the argument.) As F 1 ≤ p F std by lemma 4.1, it is sufficient to show F adm ≤ p F 1 . Assume we are given an F adm -proof π of a formula Φ. Let Sub(π) be the set of subformulas of all formulas from π, S = Sub(π) ∪ {ϕ → ψ; ϕ, ψ ∈ Sub(π)}, and let P (ϕ) denote the property
Claim 1 If L 0 = S4, P ( χ → i ω i ), and χ ∈ Sub(π), then P ( χ → ω i ) for some i.
Proof: Define a propositional valuation | by | ϕ iff P ( χ → ϕ).
As P ( χ → χ), i.e., | χ, it suffices to show that P (ϕ) implies |ϕ, which we verify by induction on the length of an F 1 -proof Π ⊆ S of ϕ.
The steps for propositional rules are trivial.
) and P ( χ → ϕ), we get P ( χ → ψ) by propositional reasoning.
(Nec): P (ϕ) and P ( ϕ) (hence ϕ ∈ Sub(π)) imply P ( χ → ϕ) by propositional reasoning. (RNec): assume P ( ϕ → ψ), and | ϕ. Then P ( χ → ϕ), thus P ( χ → ϕ) by (RNec), and P ( χ → ψ) by propositional reasoning, which means | ψ.
(4): assume P ( ϕ → ϕ) and | ϕ, i.e., P ( χ → ϕ).
, where τ has the form
as the root of F is reflexive. Assume P (ϕ) and |τ . Then P ( χ → ( ϕ 0 → ϕ 0 )), and P ( χ → ψ i ), thus P ( χ → τ ) by (RNec) and propositional reasoning. This propositionally implies P ( χ → ϕ 0 ), i.e., | ϕ 0 . As we have |( ϕ 0 → ϕ 0 ) from |τ , we obtain |ϕ 0 .
Proof: We define a propositional valuation | as
by induction on the complexity of ϕ, where χ := j χ j . As P ( χ → χ j ) by propositional reasoning, we have |( j (χ j ≡ χ j )). Therefore it suffices to verify that P (ϕ) implies |ϕ, which we show again by induction on the length of proof. The steps for propositional rules and the axiom (T) are trivial. (K): if P ( χ → (ϕ → ψ)) and P ( χ → ϕ), we get P ( χ → ψ) by propositional reasoning, and |(ϕ → ψ), |ϕ imply |ψ.
(Nec): P (ϕ) and P ( ϕ) imply P ( χ → ϕ) by propositional reasoning, and we have |ϕ by the induction hypothesis.
(RNec): assume P ( ϕ → ψ), and | ϕ. Then P ( χ → ϕ), thus P ( χ → ϕ) by (RNec), and P ( χ → ψ) by propositional reasoning. We have |( ϕ → ψ) by the induction hypothesis, which implies |ψ and | ψ.
(4): assume P ( ϕ → ϕ) and | ϕ. Then P ( χ → ϕ), and P ( χ → ϕ) by (RNec), thus | ϕ. α(F, D): we have ϕ = τ → ϕ 0 , where τ has the form
as the root cluster of F is proper. Assume P (ϕ) and |τ . Then
, and P ( χ → ψ i ). By (RNec) and propositional reasoning, we have P ( χ → ϕ 0 ), P ( χ → ϕ 0 ), and P ( χ → ϕ 1 ). We have also |(ϕ 0 ∨ ϕ 1 ). If |ϕ 0 , we are done; otherwise |ϕ 1 , thus | ϕ 1 , which implies |ϕ 0 as |( ϕ 1 → ϕ 0 ).
(Claim 2)
Proof: By omitting χ from the proof of claim 1 or claim 2, whichever is applicable.
(Claim 3)
We resume the proof of the main theorem. We show by induction on the length of proof that
The induction steps for rules of F std are straightforward, as F std ⊆ F 1 , and π ⊆ S. Consider an instance
by the induction hypothesis. By claim 3, P (χ) or
In the latter case, we get P ( ϕ → ψ i ) for some i < n by claim 1. Using necessitation and propositional reasoning, we obtain
Instances of A • are handled similarly, using claim 2.
In particular, P (Φ) holds, i.e., there is an F 1 -proof Π of Φ such that Π ⊆ S. The remaining task is to construct such Π from π in polynomial time, which can be easily accomplished by a standard algorithm. We iteratively compute the set P d of formulas which have an F 1 -proof Π ⊆ S of depth at most d. On each iteration, we try to prove every formula from S P d by a single application of an F 1 -rule to formulas from P d . We will reach Φ after at most |S| iterations, thus the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
The proof of theorem 4.8 (specifically, claim 3) implies another interesting result. Definition 4.9 A proof system P has the feasible disjunction property, if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which transforms a P -proof of i ϕ i into a P -proof of one of the formulas ϕ i . This corollary generalizes the results of Ferrari et al. [5] , who have shown the feasible disjunction property of the natural deduction system for S4, S4.1, and S4Grz , and of the Frege system for GL. The proofs are apparently based on a similar intuition; the main difference is that we do not use the complicated machinery of extraction calculi.
We also mention that the proof of the main result of Mints and Kojevnikov [11] can be simplified along the lines of our theorem 4.8. In the original proof, instances of Visser's rule
are successively eliminated from a Frege proof by translating the proof to natural deduction, applying an efficient version of Kleene's slashà la [5] , and translating the proof back to the Frege system. The basic steps in this transformation are polynomial-time, but a polynomial increase in length iterated polynomially many times may result in doubly exponential increase in general; thus Mints and Kojevnikov need to establish delicate tight bounds to show that the net effect is in fact only polynomial. We outline below how to eliminate the use of natural deduction from the argument.
We consider intuitionistic logic formulated in the language {→, ∨, ∧, ⊥}, and we fix the intuitionistic standard Frege system F std consisting of (MP), and the axioms
where i = 1, 2. As the rules V n form a basis of admissible rules for IPC by Iemhoff [8] , it suffices to show that F std p-simulates F adm := F std + {V n ; n ∈ ω}.
First we need an analogy to definition 4.7. If P (ϕ) is any property of intuitionistic formulas, a P -slash is a (classical) valuation |ϕ of intuitionistic formulas which satisfies the conditions
where ϕ is defined by ϕ ⇔ (P (ϕ) ∧ |ϕ).
For example, Kleene's slash is a -slash, i.e., a P -slash for the property P (ϕ) iff "ϕ is provable".
In the modal case, propositional valuations automatically satisfy propositional axioms. In the intuitionistic case, we have the following substitute.
Lemma 4.11 Let | be a P -slash for an arbitrary P . Then |ϕ holds for all instances of axioms (A2)-(A7).
Proof: Consider for example (A6) (which is actually the most complicated case). Unwinding the definition reveals that we have to show that (ϕ 1 → ψ), (ϕ 2 → ψ) and (ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 ) imply |ψ. Since |(ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 ), we have ϕ i for some i, thus |ψ follows from |(ϕ i → ψ).
The next lemma is an analogue of claim 3 in theorem 4.8. Proof: Let Π be the closure of π under (MP), let P (ϕ) denote the property ϕ ∈ Π, and let | be a P -slash. By the definition of |, it suffices to show that |ϕ holds for every formula ϕ ∈ π, and we prove this by induction on the length of proof.
Axioms (A2)-(A7) are handled by lemma 4.11. To see that |(A1) holds, assume (ϕ → (ψ → χ)), (ϕ → ψ), and ϕ, we will show |χ. Since ϕ, the other assumptions imply |(ψ → χ) and |ψ. Moreover P (ϕ) and P (ϕ → ψ) imply P (ψ) since Π is closed under (MP), thus ψ, and |χ.
Assume that ψ was derived by (MP) from ϕ and ϕ → ψ. We have |ϕ and |(ϕ → ψ) from the induction hypothesis, and P (ϕ) as ϕ ∈ π ⊆ Π, thus ϕ, and |ψ. Now we can prove the Mints-Kojevnikov theorem. Proof: Let π be an F adm -proof of a formula Φ, we want to construct an F std -proof of Φ. We may assume that π contains F std -subproofs of formulas α → α, for every α appearing in an instance of (V n ) used in π. Let S be the set of all subformulas of formulas from π, and let R be the set of all formulas of the form
where ϕ, ψ, χ, ω ∈ S. The point of this definition is that R has the following properties: R is closed under subformulas (hence under (MP)), contains π, and satisfies
We define
and let α|ϕ be a P α -slash.
Claim 1 If α ∈ S, and P (ϕ), then α|ϕ.
Proof (sketch): Let Π ⊆ R be an F std -proof of ϕ, we prove α|ϕ by induction on the length of Π. The steps for axioms (A2)-(A7) follow from lemma 4.11. The steps for (A1) and (MP) can be shown by an easy manipulation of the slashes, using the above mentioned closure properties of R.
(Claim 1)
As in theorem 4.8, it suffices to demonstrate that Φ has an F std -proof using only formulas from R, i.e., P (Φ). We show P (ϕ) for every ϕ ∈ π by induction on the length of the subproof of ϕ. The only non-trivial case is the induction step for (V n ). Consider an instance
By the induction hypothesis, we have P ((α → α n ∨α n+1 )∨χ). Since R is closed under (MP), lemma 4.12 implies P (χ) or P (α → α n ∨α n+1 ).
In the latter case, we use claim 1 to get α|(α → α n ∨ α n+1 ), i.e., α α → α|(α n ∨ α n+1 ). Since P α (α), it is easy to see that α α i for some i ≤ n + 1, thus P (α → α i ).
In each case, we obtained P (ω) where ω is one of the disjuncts in the conclusion of (V n ). We can easily extend the proof of ω to a proof of the whole disjunction, because ω i → ω 1 ∨ ω 2 is in R whenever ω 1 ∨ ω 2 ∈ S.
A few remarks
Due to the difficulties mentioned in the introduction, we stated the main theorem only for Frege systems in the basic modal language. Nevertheless, we actually do have some degree of freedom in the choice of the language. The proof of theorem 4.8 (with minor modifications) still works if we replace {→, ⊥} with any complete set of Boolean connectives, and we may likewise replace (or combine) with ♦, or with the strict implication ϕ ⇒ ψ := (ϕ → ψ).
(We do not know whether we can take an arbitrary complete set of definable connectives as basic.)
If we consider Frege systems F 1 and F 2 formulated in different languages B 1 and B 2 , we only know how to p-simulate them in the trivial case where the languages are polynomially translatable to each other: that is, if every connective from B 1 is definable by a B 2 -formula with at most one occurence of each variable, and vice versa.
As in the classical logic, we may also define modal Extended Frege proof systems [4] , either by introducing the extension rule, or by allowing modal circuits instead of formulas in proofs.
We can obtain easily a modification of our main theorem: all Extended Frege systems for a given extensible modal logic are polynomially equivalent. In this case, we do not need any restrictions on the languages of the proof systems.
We have only considered extensible logics, it is an interesting question for which other modal (or intermediate) logics the p-equivalence of Frege systems holds. We mention that there is a trivial affirmative answer for all extensions of S4.3 (in particular, for S5). As shown by Rybakov [13] , admissible rules in such logics have a basis consisting of the single rule ♦ϕ, ♦¬ϕ ⊥.
However, F std extended by this rule is p-equivalent (in fact, identical) to F std : the extra rule cannot appear in any Frege proof, because its conclusion is inconsistent. On the other hand, there are many important modal logics for which a description of admissible rules is known, yet it is not clear how to modify our methods to establish p-equivalence of their Frege systems; examples include S4.2 and K4.3. Extended Frege systems may be easier to analyze than Frege systems; for example, it is not hard to show that all EF systems for GL.3 are p-equivalent, whereas the corresponding problem for Frege systems is open.
To generalize the question in other way, we may reformulate our results as follows: if A = A • or A = A • , then A is feasibly admissible in any logic which admits A. Are there other natural sets of rules which share this "automatic feasibility" property?
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